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I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment for Plaintiff dated December 9, 1994, an Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October
26, 1995, and a Judgment of Specific Performance dated December
14, 1995.

This Court is vested with jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1995).
II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of the Dispute,

Plaintiff/appellee, Robert D. Walter (hereinafter
"Walter"), brought this action for an order compelling the
defendants/appellants, Ria and James Berkus (hereinafter
"Berkuses"), to convey to him their interest in a parcel of
real property located in Summit County, Utah.

The Berkuses

moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no
contract between the parties since the Berkuses allegedly
revoked their counteroffer prior to Walter's acceptance.
Walter moved for summary judgment on the ground that he
accepted the counteroffer before the Berkuses notified him of
their revocation.

The Court, in two separate proceedings

before two separate judges, granted summary judgment to Walter

196U03494 4
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on his claim for specific performance.

The Court found that no

reasonable minds could differ as to the fact that Walter
accepted the Berkuses' counteroffer before there was a valid
revocation.
B,

Appellants' Mischaracterization of "Facts".

The Berkuses characterize several matters as "fact"
which are not supported by the record.

Those matters are as

follows:
1.

The Berkuses state as fact that "Mr. and

Mrs. Olches' assistant at the brokerage house was Kate
Doordan."

This is a mischaracterization of the facts.

Janet

Olch, Jon Olch and Kate Doordan testified that Ms. Doordan
served as a secretary/receptionist for Bald Eagle Realty.
at 685-87.)

(R.

Ms. Doordan was employed by Bald Eagle Realty

under contract and received no compensation from Janet Olch.
(id.)

Ms. Doordan's employment was supervised by Jon Olch, and

she was paid by Bald Eagle Realty, a brokerage company owned by
Jon Olch.

(Id.)
2.

The Berkuses state as fact that "the scope

of Ms. Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch were broad."
is a mischaracterization.

Kate Doordan served as a secretary/

receptionist for Bald Eagle Realty.

196X103494 4

Again, this

2

She did not work for Janet

Olch.

Any services performed by Ms. Doordan on behalf of Janet

Olch were gratuitous in nature.
3.

(Id.)

The Berkuses state as fact that Mr. Berkus'

call to "the brokerage company was answered by Doordan -- Mrs.
Olch's assistant."

Again, Kate Doordan was not employed as

Janet Olch's assistant.
4.

(Id.)

The Berkuses state as fact that their

telephone call with Kate Doordan "lasted for six minutes,
terminating at 2:07 p.m."
the record.

The Berkuses have mischaracterized

The evidence shows that the telephone call began

at 2:02 p.m., and lasted for six minutes. A telephone call
that begins at 2:02 and lasts six minutes ends at 2:08.
5.

The Berkuses state as fact that Kate

Doordan "called Mr. Olch at 2:07 p.m. (MST)1 from Park City."
There is no evidence in the record to support this statement.
6.

The Berkuses correctly state as fact that

Janet Olch had a "sense of urgency about getting Walter's
signed acceptance back from Ohio."

However, the Berkuses

failed to disclose the fact that Janet Olch's "sense of
urgency" was the same as had been with her other closings.

(R.

at 666.)

X

A11 references to time of day are in the Mountain Standard
Time Zone.
196\103494 4
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7.

The Berkuses state as fact that Kate

Doordan faxed a copy of the Berkuses' revocation notice to
Walter's "administrative assistant."
is not supported by the record.

This is a conclusion that

The evidence shows that the

revocation notice was faxed to Katie Jenkins, an employee of
Cardinal Health.

Ms. Jenkins is not Walter's administrative

assistant for purposes of personal transactions.
C.

(R. at 524.)

Additional Facts to be Considered.
1.

On January 26, 1994, the Berkuses'

attorney, Ronald Lyster, faxed the counteroffer to Jon Olch.
Jon Olch then delivered the counteroffer to Janet Olch, who in
turn faxed it to Walter.
2.

(R. at 124-25.)

On Thursday, January 27, 1994, at 1:55

p.m., Walter notified Janet Olch that he had accepted the
counteroffer "as is".

Approximately 15 minutes later, Janet

informed Jon Olch of Walter's acceptance.

(R. at 125.)

then faxed his signed acceptance to Janet at 3:12 p.m.

Walter
(Id.)

Approximately ten minutes later, Janet informed Jon that she
had received Walter's signed acceptance.

Jon then informed

Janet that there was a problem because the Berkuses wanted to
withdraw their counteroffer for 24 hours.
517-18.)

196\103494 4
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(R. at 126, 512-13 &

3.

On Monday, January 31, 1994, Walter wired

$50,000 into the escrow account of High County Title as earnest
money to secure his performance under the Real Estate Purchase
Contract and counteroffer.
4.
Health.

(R. at 97.)

Katie Jenkins is an employee of Cardinal

She is not employed by Walter.

Ms. Jenkins was not

asked, nor did she consent to act on Walter's behalf in
connection with his personal affairs.
III.

(R at 524.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Berkuses advance three arguments in support of
their appeal.

First, the trial court allegedly erred in

concluding that Janet Olch was not an agent for the Berkuses.
Second, the trial court allegedly erred in concluding that
Janet Olch did not have knowledge of the Berkuses' revocation
of their counteroffer before she communicated Walter's
acceptance.

Finally, the trial court allegedly erred in

concluding that the memo containing the Berkuses' revocation
was received after Walter's acceptance.

The Berkuses'

arguments are without merit.
A.

Janet Olch Served as Walter's Agent and not as
an Agent for the Berkuses,

The record demonstrates that the Berkuses' real
estate agent was Jon Olch and that the brokerage company was
Bald Eagle Realty.
196X103494 4

The record also demonstrates that Walter's
"*

real estate agent was Janet Olch.

The record is void of any

admissible evidence to the contrary.
The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Listing
Contract & Agency Disclosures specifically identify the various
agency relationships among the parties.

The affidavits and

deposition transcripts also uniformly establish that Janet Olch
served only as Walter's agent, Jon Olch served only as the
Berkuses' agent, and Bald Eagle Realty served as the brokerage
company.

The Berkuses failed to present any evidence that

Janet Olch served as a "dual agent" or in any capacity other
than Walter's agent.
B.

Janet Olch did not have Knowledge of the
Berkuses/ Attempt to Revoke their Counteroffer
Until After she Communicated Walter's
Acceptance.

The events at issue occurred between 2:02 p.m. and
3:25 p.m. on Thursday, January 27, 1994.

The Berkuses

speculate that during this hour and twenty-three minutes, Jon
Olch told Janet Olch that the counteroffer had been revoked.
The Berkuses' speculation is not supported by the record.
The undisputed evidence before the trial court was
that Walter informed Janet Olch that the Berkuses' counteroffer
was accepted "as is." This communication occurred at 1:55
p.m., before Mr. Berkus called Bald Eagle Realty to revoke the
counteroffer.
196M03494 4

(R. at 98.)

Janet informed Jon Olch a few
6

minutes later that Walter had accepted the counteroffer.
at 125.)

(R.

At approximately 3:12 p.m., Walter faxed his signed

acceptance to Janet Olch.

(R. at 125.)

At about 3:25 p.m.,

Janet notified Jon that she had received the written acceptance
and that they had a deal. (Id.)

It was only then that Jon

informed Janet that the Berkuses had decided to take their
counteroffer "off the table" for 24 hours.
& 517-18.)
C,

(R. at 126, 512-13

There is no testimony or exhibits to the contrary.
The Memo of Revocation was not Received by
Walter Until After he had Accepted the
Counteroffer.

The record demonstrates that after Mr. Berkus called
Bald Eagle Realty at approximately 2:02 p.m., Kate Doordan
prepared a written memo to inform Walter that the counteroffer
was being taken off the table for 24 hours.

Ms. Doordan

testified that she initially was unsuccessful in faxing the
memo to Walter.

(R. at 521.)

When Ms. Doordan received a

second telecopy number, she faxed the memo to Walter.

This

occurred at approximately 3:25 p.m. (JEd.) The fax was not
received by Walter until approximately 4:25 p.m. because it had
been stored in the memory of the telecopy machine due to prior
faxes.

(R. at 524-25.)

Thus, the memo of revocation was not

received until after Walter's acceptance had been communicated
to Jon Olch, the Berkuses' agent.

196U03494 4
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IV.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE BERKUSES
It is appropriate for summary judgment to be granted
when reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be
determined from the evidence presented.

Olympus Hills Shopping

Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d
445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231
(Utah 1995); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah
1992).

The mere existence of issues of fact does not preclude

summary judgment.

Instead, the issues must be material to the

dispute. Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983);
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah
1982) .
In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present admissible evidence.
Pro. 56(e); Norton, 669 P.2d at 859.

Utah R. Civ.

The non-moving party is

not entitled to rely upon speculation and conjecture. E.g.,
Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Utah Ct.
App.), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); First Security
Bank v. Jones, 794 P.2d 679, 681 (Mont. 1990).

Moreover, if

the trial judge is the ultimate trier of fact and both parties
move for summary judgment, then summary judgment is appropriate

196X103494 4
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even though conflicting inferences are possible.

AID Ins. Co.

v. Armstrong, 811 P.2d 507 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
In this case, the Berkuses did not come forward with
any admissible evidence to create genuine issues of fact upon
which reasonable minds could differ.

Instead, they came

forward with speculation and conjecture.

The trial judge, the

ultimate trier of fact,2 rejected the Berkuses'
unsubstantiated conjecture and entered summary judgment for
Walter.

The judgment was appropriate and should be affirmed by

this Court.
A.

Janet Olch was not the Berkuses' Agent.

The Berkuses' first argument turns on the issue of
whether Walter's agent was Bald Eagle Realty or Janet Olch.
The Berkuses' assert that Walter's agent was Bald Eagle Realty
or, alternatively, that Janet Olch was their agent as well as
Walter's agent.

Their argument is contrary to (1) the express

written agreements; (2) the parties' course of conduct; and (3)
the law.
The parties created their agency relationships by
express written agreements which provide in relevant part as
follows:
2

Walter's claim of specific performance seeks an equitable
remedy. Consequently, the parties did not request a trial by
jury.
196X103494 4

9

The Seller hereby grants the Company [Bald
Eagle Realty], including Jon Olch as agent
for the Company (the "Agent") . . . the
Exclusive Right to Sell, Lease or Exchange
. . . the property . . . . The Agent
hereby agrees to use reasonable efforts to
find a buyer . . .
. . . [t]he Seller authorizes the following
to act as subagents for the Seller:
HD Agent and Principal/Branch Broker
U All agents affiliated with Company
D all other brokerages.
(R. at 129.)
At the signing of this Contract the listing
agent, Jon Olch, represents ID Seller
U Buyer, and the selling agent Janet Olch
represents
Seller
Buyer.
(R. at 133.)

Under the parties' contracts, the Berkuses

specifically declined to authorize other agents affiliated with
Bald Eagle Realty (including Janet Olch) to act on their
behalf.

Likewise, Walter acknowledged that Jon Olch and Bald

Eagle Realty were acting on behalf of the Berkuses, but not on
his behalf.

Consequently, the information communicated to Bald

Eagle Realty did not serve as notice to Walter until it was
communicated to him or his designated agent.
The parties and their agents acknowledge that they
viewed Janet Olch as Walter's agent, and Jon Olch as the
Berkuses' agent.

(R. at 124, 126, 129-36, 559 & 615.)

For

example, the Berkuses dealt solely with Jon Olch and Bald Eagle
196M03494 4
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Realty.

They did not speak with Janet Olch regarding the

counteroffer.

(See

R. at 126, 309-10, 559.)

Similarly,

Walter's communications were through Janet Olch, not Jon Olch
or Bald Eagle Realty.

(See R. at 124-26.)

When it came time

to communicate their revocation, the Berkuses did not call
Janet Olch.

Instead, Mr. Berkus called Jon Olch.

When Jon was

unavailable, Mr. Berkus requested that Kate Doordan act on
Jon's behalf to communicate the revocation to Walter or his
agent.

(R. at 559-60.)

Mr. Berkus' conduct was consistent

with the uncontroverted evidence that Janet Olch served as
Walter's agent, and Jon Olch served as the Berkuses' agent.
Moreover, the law supports the conclusion that the
parties were represented by separate real estate agents.

In

order for Bald Eagle Realty to act as an agent for both buyer
and seller, the parties are required to execute a written
agency agreement permitting such dual representation and
establishing a "limited agency."3

See Administrative Rules,

Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of Commerce, R1623

Even if a "limited agency" arrangement were to have been
created, by law, both Jon Olch and Janet Olch would have been
required to act independently in order to avoid possible
conflicts of interest and were ethically prohibited from
disclosing certain information from their principals.
Administrative Rules, Utah Department of Commerce, R1626.2.16.3.1(b) & (c). (R. at 198.) Imputation, under these
circumstances, would be improper.

196U03494 4
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6.1.11.3 SL R162-6.2.16.3 (1994).

(R. 191-99.)

While the

Berkuses agreed that Bald Eagle Realty would serve as their
brokerage company, Walter did not.

The Berkuses also declined

to allow agents affiliated with Bald Eagle Realty to act on
their behalf.

Without an express agreement, an agency or

subagency relationship is not created.

See Restatement

(Second) of Agency 1(1) (1958).
Janet Olch was merely an independent contractor
associated with Bald Eagle Realty, not an employee to whom
knowledge might be imputed.

(R. at 123.)

See Larsen v.

Christensen. 21 Utah 2d 219, 443 P.2d 402, 403 (1968)
(independent contractor's acts not imputed to contracting
party); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 & Cmt.6 (1958)
(independent contractors are not necessarily agents for
contracting party).
B.

Janet Olch was not Informed of the Berkuses'
Revocation of the Counteroffer Until After
she Conveyed Walter'a Acceptance.

It is well-established law that once the offeree has
exercised his power to create a contract by accepting an offer,
a purported revocation is ineffective.
(Second) of Contracts § 42(c) (1981).

See Restatement
In making an offer, the

offeror may specify the manner in which the offer must be

196U03494 4

12

accepted.

Crane v. Timberbrook Village Ltd., 774 P.2d 3, 4

(Utah App. Ct. 1989).
In this case, the Real Estate Purchase Contract
defines an acceptance to have occurred when the counteroffer is
signed and communicated to the Berkuses' agent.

(R. at 63.)

Walter fully complied with this manner of acceptance before he
was notified of the Berkuses' attempt to revoke the
counteroffer.

On Thursday, at 1:55 p.m., Walter told Janet

Olch that the counteroffer was accepted "as is."

Janet then

informed Jon Olch that Walter had accepted the counteroffer.
At 2:50 p.m., Walter signed the counteroffer, and at 3:12 p.m.,
faxed the acceptance to Janet.

(R. 138, 125.)

At 3:25 p.m.,

Janet informed Jon that she had received Walter's signed
acceptance.

It was only then that she learned the Berkuses

wanted to revoke their counteroffer.
1.

(R. at 125-26.)

There is no admissible evidence to support
the Berkuses' conclusion that Jon Olch
called Janet Olch prior to 3;25 p.m.

The Berkuses contend that the trial court erred in
entering summary judgment because there is "compelling
circumstantial evidence" that Walter's agent, Janet Olch, was
informed of the Berkuses' revocation before she communicated
Walter's acceptance.

The alleged circumstantial evidence is

not evidence but sheer speculation and conjecture.

1%\ 103494 4
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The

uncontradicted evidence is that Janet Olch was not informed of
the attempted revocation prior to communicating Walter's
acceptance to Mr. Olch.

(R. at 660-61, 662, 668-69, 673-77.)

According to the Berkuses, Mr. Berkus called Kate
Doordan at 2:02 p.m. and during this six minute call told Ms.
Doordan that he wanted to temporarily revoke the counteroffer.
That conversation, by the Berkuses' math, ended at 2:07 p.m.
Ms. Doordan, immediately (in fact during the last minute of her
call with Mr. Berkus) called and reached Jon Olch on his
cellular telephone.

Jon Olch then, in his 2:11 p.m.

conversation with Janet Olch, communicated the revocation to
Janet.

The Berkuses' story is not supported by the record.
First, Mr. Berkus' call to Kate Doordan terminated at

2:08 p.m., not 2:07 p.m.

A six minute telephone call starting

at 2:02 lasts until 2:08.
Second, the Berkuses' allegation that the 2:07 p.m.
call to Jon Olch was made by Kate Doordan is not supported by
any evidence.

While Jon Olch's telephone records show an

incoming call at 2:07 p.m., contrary to Berkuses' assertion,
those records do not document the origin of the call.
689-90.)

To conclude that this call had to be made by Kate

Doordan is pure conjecture.

196U03494 4
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Third, Ms. Doordan's testimony does not support the
Berkuses' story.

Ms. Doordan, notwithstanding counsel for

Berkuses' best efforts, testified that she had no recollection
of the exact timing of her conversation with Jon Olch, but does
not believe it occurred immediately after she spoke to Mr.
Berkus*

(See R. at 615; Addendum "A" attached hereto.4)

Ms.

Doordan also testified that she did not contact Janet Olch
regarding the Berkuses' desire to revoke their counteroffer
prior to 3:25 p.m.

(R. at 682-84.)

The fact that Jon Olch may

have received a one minute telephone call from someone at some
unidentified location at 2:07 p.m. does not create a reasonable
inference that Janet Olch received notice of the Berkuses'
revocation prior to Walter's acceptance.
Fourth, the Berkuses make much of the fact that the
Olches are entitled to receive a commission on the sale of the
property if Walter prevails in this case.

The Berkuses

therefore conclude that the Olches are lying.

Even assuming

financial gain was sufficient to create an issue of fact, which

4

Excerpts from the deposition of Ms. Doordan which were
cited to the trial court but are not included in the record are
attached to this brief and included as Addendum "A." (See R. at
649.)
196M03494 4
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it is not,5 the incentive for misrepresenting the facts cuts
against the Berkuses.

The Third-Party Complaint filed by the

Berkuses against Jon Olch, Bald Eagle Realty and Kate Doordan
seeks unspecified damages for breach of fiduciary duty in
failing to timely notify Walter of the revocation.
Consequently, from a liability standpoint, there is great
financial incentive for Jon Olch to simply state that he
informed Janet Olch of the Berkuses' revocation prior to
Walter's acceptance.

This would absolve him and his company of

liability to the Berkuses.

The fact that Jon Olch testified as

he did creates an inference of honesty, not dishonesty.
2•

Kate Doordan was not Janet Qlch's agent.

The Berkuses argue that Kate Doordan served as Janet
Olch's assistant.

The Berkuses conclude that if Kate Doordan

was Janet Olch's assistant, then Ms. Doordan was Janet's agent,
and, therefore, notice to Ms. Doordan constituted notice to
Walter.

Again, there is no evidence presented to substantiate

these conclusions.

5

The Berkuses allege that witness credibility is a fact
question for trial. While this is generally true, there must be
an evidentiary dispute before credibility becomes an issue.
Here, all the fact witnesses have sworn under penalty of perjury
that Jon did not contact Janet regarding the Berkuses'
revocation until 3:25 p.m. There is no evidentiary dispute to
be resolved by evaluating a witness' credibility.
196U03494 4
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Kate Doordan was an employee of Bald Eagle Realty.
She had a written contract with Bald Eagle Realty and provided
office support to Bald Eagle Realty.

(R. at 685.)

She was

paid by Bald Eagle Realty, she answered only to Jon Olch.

She

did not answer to Janet Olch, and she did not represent Janet
Olch's clients.

(R. at 685-86.)

Instead, Ms. Doordan's basic

duties were that of a secretary/receptionist.
(Id.)

(R. at 686-87.)

She had no ability to make decisions or to negotiate

contracts on behalf of Janet Olch.

(R at 686.)

The fact that

Ms. Doordan performed clerical services for some of the
affiliates of Bald Eagle Realty, including Janet Olch, does not
make her an agent for Janet Olch that would then impute Ms.
Doordan's knowledge to Walter.
Moreover, Mr. Berkuses' own testimony and
actions confirm his understanding that notice to Ms. Doordan
was not notice to Walter.

He states that he called Bald Eagle

to inform "our agent, Jonathan Olch, of our decision."
559.)

(R. at

After discovering that Mr. Olch was not in the office,

he told Ms. Doordan "to immediately fax plaintiff my
revocation," and he "was adamant that she understand the
urgency of the matter."

(R. at 560.)

Mr. Berkus understood

that communication of his revocation to Ms. Doordan was not in
any respect communication to Walter.

196\103494 4
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Mr. Berkuses' testimony

and actions are consistent with the trial court's conclusion
that Janet Olch was Walter's agent and Jon Olch was the
Berkuses' agent.
C.

Walter Accepted the Counteroffer Prior to the
Alleged Revocation at 3:25 p.m.

Acceptance of the counteroffer required two things:
(1) signing the counteroffer, and (2) communicating to the
Berkuses' agent that the counteroffer was signed.

The

undisputed facts presented to the trial court demonstrated that
Walter's agent, Janet Olch, communicated to the Berkuses'
agent, Jon Olch, that Walter had accepted the counteroffer "as
is."

This occurred at 1:55 p.m.

signed the acceptance at 2:50 p.m.

(R. at 98, 125.)
(R. at 138.)

Walter

The faxed

copy of Walter's signed acceptance was received by Janet Olch
at approximately 3:12 p.m., and communicated to Jon Olch at
3:25 p.m.

(R. at 125. )
Acceptance under the contract was completed at 2:50

p.m. when both requirements of the contract had occurred.

The

fact that Berkuses' agent was notified of the acceptance first,
before Walter had actually signed the counteroffer, is of no
legal significance.

The parties agreed that, in either

sequence, the required notice was given and the required
signature was affixed.

Alternatively, the counteroffer was

accepted at 3:25 p.m. when the signed acceptance was received
196U03494 4
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and communicated to Jon Olch.

Under either view, Walter's

acceptance occurred before he received notice of the Berkuses'
revocation.
The Berkuses contend that the memo of revocation
prepared by Kate Doordan was received by Walter at 3:25 p.m.
Thus, they argue that if the acceptance occurred at 3:25 p.m.,
and not 2:50 p.m., there is a genuine issue as to whether the
memo arrived before the acceptance was actually communicated.
Again, the Berkuses' argument misses the point.

The trial

court's entry of summary judgment is appropriate since the memo
of revocation was received by Walter after 3:25 p.m. (R. at
524-25.)
The rule is "an offeree's power of acceptance is
terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a
manifestation of the intention not to enter into the proposed
contract."

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 42 (1981).

However, revocation is ineffective if received after
acceptance.

Id. § 42 (c). In this case, Walter, the offeree,

did not receive the revocation until well after his agent
undisputedly had accepted the counteroffer.
25.)

(R. at 125, 524-

Therefore, the Berkuses' revocation was ineffective.
The Berkuses erroneously assume that communication

with Katie Jenkins, secretary for Cardinal Health, was notice
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to Walter.

The Berkuses maintain that Kate Doordan read Ms.

Jenkins the memo of revocation at the time she faxed it to
Walter's business office.

The trial court found that this

issue was not material since any notice to Katie Jenkins,
whether it came before or after Walter's acceptance, was not
notice to Walter.
Receipt by Katie Jenkins, an administrative assistant
of Cardinal Health, was not notice to Walter.

Ms. Jenkins was

an employee of Cardinal Health.

Although she

(R. at 524.)

assisted Walter in his official work at Cardinal Health, she
was not Walter's personal agent.

At best, she was merely a

messenger who could relay information to Walter.

See

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 68, illus. 2 (1981)
(receipt of telegraph by messenger boy is not receipt by
offeree).

Even if Ms. Jenkins were considered Walter's agent

in some sense, notice to her was not notice to Walter for all
purposes.

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 268 (c) (1958)

(the principal is not bound by a notification directed towards
an agent whose duties or apparent duties have no connection
with the subject matter to which the notification relates);
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints, 534 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah
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1975) (notice to church employee was not notice to church in
view of employee's merely clerical duties).
Walter has never authorized Katie Jenkins to act on
his behalf in connection with his personal real estate matters,
(R. at 524,)

It has long been the rule in Utah that:

Notice to an agent is notice to its
principal is not applicable unless notice
has reference to business in which the
agent is engaged under authority (the
principal) and is pertinent to matters
coming within the authority; . . . Notice
to or knowledge of a mere ministerial
agent, clerk or servant will not be imputed
to the principal.
Independent Oil and Gas Co. v. Shelton, 79 Utah 384, 6 P.2d
1027 (1932); accord 3 C.J.S. Agency § 436, pp. 303-304 (1973)
("Knowledge of a servant, or one performing ministerial duties
for another, will not be charged to the latter").

Notice to

Katie Jenkins, as a matter of law, was not notice to Walter.
V.

CONCLUSION

Both trial judges properly concluded that Walter was
entitled to summary judgment against the Berkuses.

Based upon

the uncontroverted evidence, Judge Iwasaki found that Janet
Olch was the agent for Walter, and Jon Olch and Bald Eagle
Realty were the agents for the Berkuses.

Judge Iwasaki's

finding is substantiated by the testimony of Janet Olch, Jon
Olch and Kate Doordan, together with the Real Estate Purchase

196X103494 4

21

Contract and the Listing Contract & Agency Disclosures.

There

was absolutely no evidence presented by the Berkuses to
demonstrate that Janet Olch was acting in any capacity other
than Walter's agent.

Therefore, the trial court properly found

that knowledge to Bald Eagle Realty or Jon Olch could not be
imputed to Janet Olch or Walter.
The trial court also properly found that there was no
evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ as to the
fact that Janet Olch did not have knowledge of the Berkuses'
attempt to revoke their counteroffer until after she had
communicated Walter's acceptance.

The "parade of horrors"

presented by the Berkuses (e.g., phantom telephone calls, the
inferences that calls had to occur due to "a sense of urgency",
and motivations to misrepresent facts in order to earn a
commission) are pure conjecture.

Every witness testified in

their deposition or affidavit that at the time Janet Olch
communicated Walter's acceptance to Jon Olch, she did not have
knowledge of the Berkuses' attempt to revoke their
counteroffer.
Finally, the trial court properly found that Walter
did not have constructive or actual knowledge of the Berkuses'
attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his acceptance.
Based upon the uncontroverted evidence, Judge Noel found that
196M03494 4
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the memo of revocation was not received until well after 3:25
p.m.

Judge Noel also correctly found that Katie Jenkins was

not an agent for Walter, but rather an employee of Cardinal
Health.

Therefore, any notice to Ms. Jenkins was not imputed

to Walter.

Based upon these uncontroverted facts, the trial

court properly found that Walter was entitled to summary
judgment of specific performance-

Therefore, this Court should

deny the Berkuses' appeal and affirm the trial court's Order
Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff dated December
9, 1994, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
dated October 26, 1995, and Judgment of Specific Performance
dated December 14, 1995.

This Court should also remand the

case to the trial court for an award of attorney's fees and
damages on the appeal bond.
DATED this

Lb —

day of May, 1996.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By:

'/

~ « ,*-.- s

Bryon J. Benevento
Attorneys—^ or Appellee

196U03494 4

23

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be handdelivered this

l6'— day of May, 1996, to the following:

John T. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Mark J. Williams, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

196U03494 4

24

Addendum A

MR. BENEVENTO:
MR. WILLIAMS:
Q

Objection, speculation.
I'll join in that.

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Let me ask you this, do you have

a distinct recollection of not calling Jon Olch immediately
after Mr. Berkus called you or is it something that you just
don't remember?
A

It's something that I just don't remember.

Q

Let me invite your attention back to Exhibit 8.
Could you give that to her, Counsel?
And I'd like to invite your attention to the second

page, please, to the date January 27th, 1994, do you see that
about two thirds of the way down?
A

Yes.

Q

And according to Mr. Olch's cellular phone record a

2:07 that day he had an incoming call from Park City, is that
right?
MR. BENEVENTO:
Q

Objection, foundation.

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Is that what that appears to

reflect?
MR. BENEVENTO:
itself.

Objection, the document speaks for

It's a matter of phone records.
MR. ANDERSON:

She can answer that.

MR. BENEVENTO:

It's self-servicing.

MR. WILLIAMS:

If you can answer it.

Go ahead.

you have no personal knowledge, indicate so.
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If

THE WITNESS:

Where do you draw the line on personal

knowledge, because Ifm reading it here and because I knew it?
MR. WILLIAMS:

If you understand the exhibit and

understand what it signifies.
THE WITNESS:

Then Ifm sorry, John, would you just

ask me the question again?
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

Sure.

Does it appear to reflect

that at 2:07 p.m. Mr. Olch received on his cellular phone an
incoming call from Park City?
A

It does but I don't understand the...

Q

Let me ask the question.

A

Let me, as long as I'm going to be answering this.

At 2:07 Park City, Utah, incoming 640-0244.

It doesn't say

where, oh, it says to call origin-MR. BENEVENTO:

Again I renew my objection on

foundation.
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

A

Yes, okay, under call origin it says Park City.
MR. WILLIAMS:

Incoming from Park City?

Let's me also join in that objection

based on her answer.
Q

(BY MR. ANDERSON)

And having looked at that at

entry does that help refresh your recollection as to whether
you called Mr. Olch right after you terminated your call with
Mr. Berkus?
A

No.
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Q

And what did you tell Jon at 2:15?

A

I don't remember that conversation.

Q

It indicates that you informed him of the Berkus

call/ is that accurate?
A

Yes, it does.

A

Do you recall having informed Mr. Olch of that fac

about five or ten minutes earlier?
A

Earlier than what?

Q

Than 2:15?

A

No.

Q

What did Mr. Olch say in response to what you told

A

I do not remember.

Q

No recollection whatsoever?

A

Honestly, John, I cannot remember what he said.

Q

What did you say?

A

I do not remember that.

Q

Did you ask Mr. Olch during that conversation what

him?

you should do?
A

I do not remember.

Q

Do you remember any aspect of the conversation?

A

No.

Q

Do you recall whether he was surprised at the

information that you had imparted to him?
MR. BENEVENTO:

Objection, speculation as to it
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